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INTRODUCTION 
reedom of information and governmental transparency 
require champions. Lawyers and even some politicians may 
fondly believe that they are the self-appointed champions. 
However, journalists may have at least an equal claim to a 
leadership role. They may be viewed as unencumbered by the 
special interests of their client or their political party. More 
positively, journalists have a special public interest role to play in 
informing the public.  
The European Court of Human Rights has been keen to underline 
the press role as champions of informing the public, including even 
in regard to the reporting of materials regarding terrorism, such as 
the speech of an extremist. In Castells v. Spain,1 it was suggested 
that: 
 “Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best 
means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas 
and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular, it gives 
politicians the opportunity to reflect and comment on the 
preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone 
to participate in the free political debate which is at the very 
core of the concept of a democratic society.” 
The conferment of a special press role was extended in Jersild v. 
Denmark,2 where the European Court of Human Rights accepted 
that “Although formulated primarily with regard to the print 
media, these principles doubtless apply also to the audio-visual 
media”.  
One may also find in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights more specific approbation of the role on 
investigative journalism through its attraction of an especially high 
                                                
1 App. No.11798/85, Ser. A, Vol.236 (1992), para.43.  
2 App. No.15890/88, Ser. A, Vol.298 (1995), para.31. 
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level of protection in principle, both against claims to the 
disclosure of sources3 and challenges by way of libel suit.4  
In pursuit of their role as champions of freedom of information 
and governmental transparency, journalists are avid customers of 
freedom of information legislation. The House of Commons 
Justice Committee in its report, Post-legislative scrutiny of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000,5 was told by the Society of Editors that, “The 
Act has become an essential journalistic tool which has helped 
create a climate of genuine openness and transparency in British 
public life.”6 
This paper does not directly address the technicalities of freedom 
of information legislation as encountered by journalists. Instead, 
there is a broader theme but a narrower context. The focus is on 
investigations by journalists in which they seek to bring new 
information to the attention of the public but confined to the issue 
of terrorism. Attention was drawn to this theme in the United 
Kingdom by the case of David Miranda in 2013. He was detained 
as a suspected terrorist at Heathrow Airport for the possession of 
materials supplied from Edward Snowden, materials being 
transported from Russia to Brazil for journalistic purposes. This 
episode, which is considered later, is dramatized by title of this 
paper, “Journalist or Terrorist”. However, this paper addresses a 
wider issue than the precise circumstances of the Miranda case 
which is how journalism has been affected by the context of 
terrorism. 
The threat of terrorism works in two ways against journalism. First, 
the stance of terrorists towards journalists seems to have become 
much more hostile. In recent times, journalists have become targets 
rather than witnesses or messengers. One early example of this 
trend was the killing of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002.7 More 
recent illustrations of the targeting of journalists involve the 
murder of Charlie Hebdo journalists in Paris on 7 January 20158 and 
                                                
3 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No.17488/90, 1996-II; Nordisk Film & TV 
A/S v. Denmark, App. No.40485/02, 8 December 2005; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 
App. No. 64752/01, 22 November 2007; Financial Times Ltd v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 821/03, 15 December 2009; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. Netherlands, App. 
No. 38224/03, 14 September 2010; Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media 
B.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 39315/06, 22 November 2012. 
4 See Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, 10 May 2011, para.129. See 
also Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, App. No.33348/96, 17 December 2004, 
para. 96. 
5 (2012-13 HC 96-I) para. 14. See also Government Reponse (Cm.8505, London, 
2012). 
6 See also Home Office and Ministry of Justice v. Information Commissioner [2009] EWHC 
1611 (Admin) para 27; T. Felle and J. Mair, FOI 10 YEARS ON: FREEDOM 
FIGHTING OR LAZY JOURNALISM? (Abramis, London, 2015). 
7 Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh was sentenced to death in Hyderabad in 2002: 
Rory McCarthy, “Case closed?: Murky underworld where terror and security 
meet: Pearl trial ends but doubts exist on military's role”, THE GUARDIAN, 16 
July 2002 p.10; Daniel McGrory, “CIA paid Pakistan for terror suspects” THE 
AUSTRALIAN, 26 September 2006 p. 9. 
8 See http://www.lemonde.fr/attaque-contre-charlie-hebdo/. 
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killings by the Islamic State and its affiliates in Syria.9 Reasons for 
this growing hostility may include not only the vehemence of the 
rejection by Islamist groups of modernist cultures, but also, and 
paradoxically, their embrace of new media technologies. The 
internet affords several advantages to terrorists; compared to print 
media, it is harder to control and close down, it has better cross-
jurisdictional reach, and it has lower running costs.10 Furthermore, 
the internet means that terrorists are no longer wholly reliant on 
the established (and often Western based) mass media to act as 
carriers and intermediaries, thereby allowing them to attain 
otherwise unattainable prominence, explicitness, and meaning to 
their violence.11 Thus, the internet now presents terrorists, whether 
mass movements or lone actors, with increased opportunities to 
propagate globally their own interpretations and messages,12 and so 
jihadis and their online fans — “jihobbyists”13 — increasingly have 
greater recourse to mainstream social media platforms.14 Al-Qa’ida 
in the Arabian Peninsula’s online Inspire publication has been 
viewed as highly successful.15 Now, IS and their online supporters 
have proven themselves to be adept and prolific producers and 
disseminators of digital content.16 This growth of online content 
from terrorist groups and its potential attractiveness to, and 
                                                
9 See “Number of journalists killed in Syria passes the 150 mark”, MIDDLE EAST 
MONITOR, 4 April 2013: 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/5655-number-of-
journalists-killed-in-syria-passes-the-150-mark.  
Later examples include the beheadings of James Foley (2014), Steven Sotloff 
(2014), and Kenji Goto (2015). 
10 See M. Conway and C. Walker, Countering Terrorism via the internet in G. 
LENNON AND C. WALKER, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
TERRORISM (Routledge, Abingdon, 2015) 
11 See S.L CARRUTHERS, THE MEDIA AT WAR (MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2000) p 
170. These media roles sometimes resulted in threats of prosecution either for 
withholding information or for “apology” of terrorism: C WALKER, TERRORISM 
AND THE LAW (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) ch. 8. 
12 See M. Conway, Cybercortical Warfare: Hizbollah’s Internet Strategy in S. OATES, D. 
OWEN, AND R. GIBSON (EDS), THE INTERNET AND POLITICS: CITIZENS, 
VOTERS AND ACTIVISTS (Routledge, Abingdon, 2005); M. Conway, Terrorist web 
sites in P. SEIB (ED.), MEDIA AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005); K. Damphouse, The dark side of the web 
in F. SCHMALLEGER AND M. PITTARO, CRIMES OF THE INTERNET (Prentice 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 2008); G. WEIMANN, NEW TERRORISM 
AND NEW MEDIA (Wilson Center, Washington DC, 2014). 
13 J. BRACHMAN, GLOBAL JIHADISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2009) 19. For Irish Republican internet usages, see R. Frennett and 
M.L.R. Smith, IRA 2.0 (2012) 24 Terrorism & Political Violence 375. For right-wing 
groups, see GERMAN FEDERAL OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS AND THEIR INTERNET PRESENCE 
(Cologne, 2013) 
14 A.Y. ZELIN, THE STATE OF GLOBAL JIHAD ONLINE (New America 
Foundation, Washington DC, 2013). 
15 See A.F. Lemieux et al, Inspire Magazine (2014) 26 TERRORISM & POLITICAL 
VIOLENCE 354.  
16 See H.J. Ingram, Three traits of the Islamic State’s information warfare (2014) 159 (6) 
RUSI JOURNAL 4; J. Klausen, Tweeting the Jihad: social media networks of western foreign 
fighters in Syria and Iraq (2015) 38 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1. 
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resonance with, discontented “digital natives” (young people who 
have grown up with the internet) have become causes of official 
apprehension throughout Europe17 and globally. Therefore, the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 of 24 September 
2014 (“Addressing the growing issue of foreign terrorist fighters”), 
article 17, “urges Member States, in this context, to act 
cooperatively when taking national measures to prevent terrorists 
from exploiting technology, communications and resources, 
including audio and video, to incite support for terrorist acts, while 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in 
compliance with other obligations under international law”. 
It is dangerous enough to be under attack from terrorism, but what 
this paper is concerned with is the growing attack from the state 
when it is countering terrorism. The core purpose of the paper is 
first to compile some evidence of this counter-terrorism threat to 
journalism. It is argued that a three-pronged attack emerges.  
First, there is the criminalization of journalistic activities by which 
the process of obtaining information and distilling it into news 
stories becomes depicted as a terrorist threat to the state. This first 
part of the paper considers the prime example of David Miranda. 
Second, there is the demand for information from the activities of 
journalism. In this way, journalism is coerced into serving state 
interests, even if contrary to the journalistic ethics on which the 
information was amassed. This second aspect may involve the 
voluntary trading of information through ongoing police-media 
relationships, but the interest of this paper lies in more coercive 
approaches. These will involve demands backed by legal sanctions, 
such as criminal offences or contempt of court. 
Third, and perhaps most insidious of all, there is a demand for 
proactive information-giving from the media to the security 
authorities. In the United Kingdom, there is again an element of 
criminal coercion through anti-terrorism laws which is not 
common elsewhere in the Western world. This imposed duty of 
the media to provide information proactively without demand has 
become broader and shriller. 
Having explored these three areas of challenge, the next part of the 
paper will analyse why these trends are occurring. Several suggested 
causes are mentioned. Some relate to the nature of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism. Some relate to the nature of the media. The 
analysis will be followed by some conclusions and the appropriate 
reactions. 
§ 1 – CRIMINALISATION OF JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITIES 
The criminalisation of journalistic activities arises from the 
realization that investigative journalism can pose a threat to state 
security. By way of evidence of current attitudes, the Joint Services 
                                                
17 See for example, See EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in consultation with 
the Commission services and the EEAS, Foreign Fighters and returnees (16002/14, 
Brussels, 2014) pp.2-3. 
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Publication 440, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, a restricted 
security manual which was issued in 2001 and later revealed by 
Wikileaks, is instructive.18 It lists investigative journalists as a “non-
traditional threat” to security whose activities are to be guarded 
against in the same way as foreign intelligence services and 
subversive or terrorist organizations. Thus:19 
“Government assets are under threat from a variety of sources 
beyond those traditionally regarded as hostile or otherwise of 
significance in terms of national security. The responsibility for 
providing advice to counter non-traditional threats will not always 
lie with the security staff and may often be provided by the 
appropriate Service, MOD or civil police agency. The main threats 
of this type are posed by investigative journalists, pressure groups, 
investigation agencies, criminal elements, disaffected staff, 
dishonest staff and computer hackers.” 
This perception is not new. Various prominent prosecutions have 
been mounted against investigative journalists under official secrets 
legislation.20 Prominent examples in the modern era21 have 
included: R. v. Cairns, Aitken and Roberts in 1971, concerning a 
military assessment of the Biafran war;22 and R. v. Aubrey, Berry and 
Campbell in 1978, concerning army signals intelligence.23 In the case 
of The Guardian,24 in 2011, the Metropolitan Police began 
proceedings to force the newspaper to reveal how it obtained 
information that the mobile phone of a missing schoolgirl (Milly 
Dowler) had been hacked. However, the consent to prosecution of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions was not forthcoming.  
The danger of the criminalization of journalists in connection with 
their reporting of terrorism lurks not only in the breadth of 
information which a government might view as useful to terrorism 
but also in what is counted as “terrorism”. Amongst the special 
offences of greatest threat to journalism in the United Kingdom 
include section 58 (possession of information useful to terrorism), 
                                                
18  http://wikileaks.org/wiki/UK_MoD_Manual_of_Security_Volumes_1,_2_and_
3_Issue_2,_JSP-440,_RESTRICTED,_2389_pages,_2001. 
19 Ibid., para 0111. 
20 Most were brought under the Official Secrets Act 1911, s. 2, which was 
repealed and replaced by the Official Secrets Act 1989. See Departmental 
Committee on Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, REPORT (Cmnd.5014, 
London, 1972); Home Office, REFORM OF SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL 
SECRETS ACT 1911 (Cmnd.7285, London, 1978); Home Office, REFORM OF 
SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT 1911 (Cm.408, London, 1988) 
21 See also R v. Frederick Henry Budgen, THE TIMES, 15 July 1932, p. 4, and 13 
August 1932, p. 5 (see J. Jaconelli, Wills as public documents – privacy and property rights 
(2012) 71 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 147, pp.153-154); Compton Mackenzie 
(1932) (as described in his autobiography, MY LIFE AND TIMES, OCTAVE SEVEN, 
(1931–38) (Chatto & Windus, London, 1968). 
22 THE TIMES, 4 February 1971, pp. 1, 2, and 15. See J. Aitken, OFFICIALLY 
SECRET (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1971). 
23 See D. Campbell, Official Secrecy and British Libertarianism (1979) 16 SOCIALIST 
REGISTER 75; A. Crispin WHO'S WATCHING YOU? BRITAIN'S SECURITY 
SERVICES & THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT (Penguin Books, London, 1981); G. 
Robertson, THE JUSTICE GAME (Vintage Books, London, 1999) chap.5. 
24 See M. Zander, Dropping the case (2011) 175 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 573. 
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section 58A (eliciting, publishing or communicating information 
about members of the security forces of a kind useful for terrorism 
such as by taking photographs), and the offence of attending 
training sites under section 8 of the Terrorism Act 2006. 
The most prominent recent illustration is, as mentioned earlier, the 
case of David Miranda. Miranda was not charged with any offence, 
but the portrayal of him (and his colleagues) as suspected terrorists 
opened up special policing powers and raised the possibility of 
charges with special offences. In Miranda v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department,25 the facts were that David Miranda was 
transporting computer materials (including files from the 
Government Communications Headquarters – “GCHQ”) 
supplied by Edward Snowden, a former contractor with the U.S. 
National Security Agency, to journalist Glenn Greenwald to assist 
ongoing disclosures in The Guardian about GCHQ and the NSA. 
The materials were seized during an examination and detention of 
Miranda while transiting through Heathrow Airport.26  
The powers which were invoked were port and border control 
powers under Part V and Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000.27 
Their purpose is to disrupt possible terrorist planning and logistics 
and also to gather intelligence. The controls also deter attacks on 
the travel facilities themselves. Examining officers (who are mainly 
police officers) may question a person under Schedule 7, 
paragraph 1, for the purpose of determining whether he appears to 
be a “terrorist” within the Terrorism Act 2000, section 40(1)(b).28 
Reflecting the “all-risks” nature of these powers,29 examining 
officers may exercise their powers whether or not they have 
suspicion against any individual (paragraph 2). In this way, the 
“copper’s nose”30 may guide application. Some interventions will 
be based on intelligence perhaps related to destination, behavioural 
signals, or on documentary irregularities.31 However, the use of 
examinations for extraneous purposes, such as to build the case for 
the issuance of an executive order, is not permitted, as sustained in 
CC v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.32 At the same time, that 
case confirms: that the basis for intervention can be intuition; that 
the powers can be applied against someone already suspect in order 
to determine details of involvement; and that examinations can 
                                                
25 [2014] EWHC 225. 
26 See Sch.7, paras.1(3), 2(2); Immigration Rules 2003, rr.47–49. 
27 See C. Walker, THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION (3rd ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2014) chap.5. 
28 See further C.P. Walker, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW 
(2nd ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992) p.214. 
29 See C. Walker, Neighbor terrorism and the all-risks policing of terrorism (2009), 3 
JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 121. 
30 Lord Carlile, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2006 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 
2000 (Home Office, London, 2007) para. 33. 
31 See R (K) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (CO10027/2011), reported 
in D. Anderson, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2011 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 
2000 AND PART I OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 (Home Office, London, 2012) 
para 9.37. 
32 [2011] EWHC 3316 (Admin). 
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continue even if initial indications of terrorism are negative.33 A 
requirement of reasonable suspicion would, it is claimed, 
compromise police capability to detect terrorism34 such as where a 
person is involved “unknowingly” or is of interest based on their 
destination.35 Reasonable suspicion requirements might also 
encourage the use of “clean skins”, alert suspects to surveillance, 
and prevent the examination of travel companions.36 To allay some 
these concerns, an accompany Code of Practice issues an 
admonition not to discriminate or to select based on ethnic 
characteristics37 and seeks to focus selection based upon: “Known 
and suspected sources of terrorism; Individuals or groups whose 
current or past involvement in acts or threats of terrorism is known 
or suspected, and supporters or sponsors of such activity who are 
known or suspected; Any information on the origins and/or 
location of terrorist groups; Possible current, emerging and future 
terrorist activity; The means of travel (and documentation) that a 
group or individuals involved in terrorist activity could use; 
Emerging local trends or patterns of travel through specific ports 
or in the wider vicinity that may be linked to terrorist activity; 
and/or Observation of an individual’s behaviour”.38 
In the case of Miranda, the initial view of the Security Service (MI5), 
which issued a “Port Circulation Sheet” to the police Counter 
Terrorism Command regarding Miranda, was that Schedule 7 was 
“not applicable”.39 These doubts were not conveyed to the 
examining officers on the ground. However, a third round of 
deliberations by the security agents concluded that Miranda was 
concerned in terrorism because his mission sought to influence the 
government by promoting a political or ideological cause under the 
Terrorism Act 2000, section 1(1)(b) and (c).40 An alternative 
explanation, which denies the applicability of Schedule 7 and claims 
that the mission was one of revealing interesting facts to sell 
newspapers, was not proffered as such, and, instead, Greenwald 
claimed in the subsequent litigation the purpose of “responsible 
journalism” in the public interest,41 an asserted privilege dismissed 
on the basis that journalists have no constitutional responsibility.42 
By comparison, a more convincing claim to a purely journalistic 
                                                
33 Ibid., paras.11, 16, 18. 
34 Ibid., para. 9. 
35 Joint Committee on Human Rights, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: ANTI-SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOUR, CRIME AND POLICING BILL (SECOND REPORT) (2013–14 HL 
108/HC 951) para. 24. 
36 D. Anderson, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2012 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 
2000 AND PART I OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 (Home Office, London, 2013) 
para. 10.58. 
37 Home Office, Examining Officers and Review Officers under Schedule 7 to 
the Terrorism Act 2000: Code of Practice (London, 2014) paras.4, 18. 
38 Ibid., para. 19. 
39 [2014] EWHC 225, paras.9, 10. 
40 Ibid., para. 12. 
41 Ibid., para. 55. See further See G. Greenwald, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD 
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (Metropolitan 
Books, New York, 2014) chap.5. 
42 Ibid., para. 71. 
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mission was sustained in R v. Murney.43 Here the collection of 
information about policing in Newry by an officer of éirígí (a 
socialist republican political party in Ireland) was not an offence 
under the Terrorism Act 2000, section 58A (eliciting, publishing or 
communicating information about members of the security forces 
which is of a kind likely to be useful for terrorism); while 
photographs of police activity could assist terrorism, proof of a 
reasonable cause — public concern about police abuses — was 
sustained. As for potential impact under the Terrorism Act 2000, 
section 1(2)(c) and (d), it was sufficient that the examining officers 
contemplated that disclosure of data to a hostile state (Russia) or 
to terrorists might imperil the identities of secret agents or the 
methods used for electronic surveillance of terrorists.44 Thus, the 
material was placed in the realms of terrorism and not just official 
secrecy.45 The formulation of “terrorism” in the mind of the 
examining officer did not require any specific offence to be 
formulated, nor must mens rea (beyond the “design” and “purpose” 
detectable from the mission) be established on the part of the 
traveller since there could be interest either in material being 
transported or in the traveller.46 Nevertheless, the power must be 
exercised on “some reasoned basis, proportionately … and in good 
faith”.47 There was no need to conclude that Miranda was a person 
falling within section 40(1)(b) prior to the stop.48 Nor did his 
express targeting exclude the exercise of Schedule 7; as stated in 
CC v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, “the language of 
s.40(1)(b) is wide enough to allow for examination not only of 
whether he appears to be a terrorist but also of the way in which 
or the act by which he so appears.”49 There was a compelling and 
proportionate interest to seize the data, especially as the court 
denied the status of “journalistic materials” within Article 10, albeit 
on the dubious basis that they had been stolen.50  
The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (David 
Anderson) commented that the High Court had endorsed so a wide 
ambit for the term “terrorism” that journalists and newspapers 
could potentially become subject to special criminal offences, 
could be proscribed (banned), could be designated under terrorist 
asset-freezing legislation, and could be subjected to executive 
restraint orders.51 At the same time, the potential must be seen in 
the context of requirements of proportionality and respect for 
                                                
43 [2014] NICC 4. 
44 [2014] EWHC 225, paras.24, 26. 
45 Ibid., paras.24, 25. 
46 [2014] EWHC 225, para. 34. See M. Zander, Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
(2014) 178 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 151 
47 [2014] EWHC 225, para. 31. 
48 Ibid., para 34. 
49 [2011] EWHC 3316 (Admin), para 16. 
50 Ibid., paras 48, 49, 72. 
51 D. Anderson, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2013 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 
2000 AND PART I OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 (Home Office, London, 2014) 
paras.4.11-4.23. The GOVERNMENT RESPONSE is to await the outcome of 
further litigation (Cm.9032, London, 2015) p.7. 
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rights to free speech, so that Law Justice Laws made clear that 
“There is no suggestion that media reporting on terrorism ought 
per se to be considered equivalent to assisting terrorists’52 
As well as being stopped for examination, the traveller may also be 
searched under paragraph 8 by an examining officer (or a person 
authorized under paragraph 10).53 Property may be seized for 
investigation for seven days under paragraph 11. An increasingly 
common seizure scenario has involved the capture of data from 
laptops, data devices, and mobile phones. The practice has been to 
return the hardware within seven days but to keep the copied data 
in accordance with the guidance in the Management of Police 
Information (“MoPI”),54 which suggests a six-year retention period.55 
Seizure of data, which was being transported for journalistic 
purposes, was at the heart of a further hearing in R (Miranda) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.56 An interim hearing was 
held about the seized computer data. It was held that inspection 
may take place for the purposes of securing national security or for 
the investigation of terrorism.57 There was no exemption for 
journalistic materials. Once the material is obtained under 
Schedule 7, it can be transferred to the security authorities under 
section 19 of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. The data was 
transferred and retained even though Miranda was allowed to 
depart, and no further legal action has ensued either in relation to 
the data or Miranda (whose criminal mens rea might be affected by 
the heavy encryption of the data). The High Court referred to the 
data being “stolen”,58 but Snowden held copied information,59 and 
the hardware possessed by Miranda was not stolen. Consequently, 
no evident legal basis for police retention emerged to override 
paragraph 11.60 Reflecting the need to keep up to date with 
technological developments,61 as highlighted in the Miranda case, 
later legislation, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014, Schedule 9, paragraph 4 inserted paragraph 11A into 
                                                
52 David Miranda v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department and The Commissioner 
of the Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 255 [35] 
53 These provisions were reformed by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014, Sch.9, following the Home Office, REVIEW OF THE 
OPERATION OF SCHEDULE 7: A PUBLIC CONSULTATION (London, 2012). 
54 http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/information/2010/201004INFMO
PI01.pdf. This guidance is viewed as relevant by the Home Office, EXAMINING 
OFFICERS AND REVIEW OFFICERS UNDER SCHEDULE 7 TO THE TERRORISM 
ACT 2000: CODE OF PRACTICE (London, 2014) para. 40. 
55 See R (RMC & FJ) v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2012] EWHC 1681 
(Admin); MM v. United Kingdom, App. No.24029/97, 13 November 2012. 
56 [2013] EWHC 2609 (Admin). 
57 Ibid., para 32. 
58 Miranda v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 225, para. 8. 
59 See Oxford v. Moss (1979) 68 Cr App Rep 183. 
60 See Costello v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2001] 3 All ER 150; Webb v. Chief 
Constable of Merseyside [2000] QB 427; Settelen v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
[2004] EWHC 2171 Ch. A resolution might be possible under the Official 
Secrets Act 1989, s.8. 
61 Hansard (House of Commons) Public Bill Committee col.454 (9 July 2013), 
Damian Green. 
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Schedule 7. It grants an express power for police constables only62 
to make and retain copies of anything obtained from searches 
under paragraph 5, 8, or 9. Copies may be retained for as long as is 
necessary for investigative purposes or for use as evidence in 
criminal or deportation proceedings. However, retention is subject 
to the Data Protection Act 1998 and the MoPI guidance. 
Suggestions that these powers (and other search powers in 
Schedule 7) should be exercisable on reasonable suspicion63 and 
that legally privileged and special procedure (including journalistic) 
material should be exempted were rejected during passage through 
Parliament.64 
The Home Office65 is confident that the port controls are 
compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights 
following the changes in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014, having previously received assurances to that 
effect in the cases of Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom,66 Beghal v. 
DPP,67 and Miranda.68 Intrusions on liberty probably fall within the 
exception for a stated legal “obligation” under Article 5(1)(b), with 
particular indulgence being shown for intrusions at borders.69 This 
verdict was reached by the European Commission of Human 
Rights in regard to travellers to and from both parts of Ireland in 
McVeigh70 and in Harkin, X, Lyttle, Gillen, and McCann v. United 
Kingdom.71 Next, in Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom, the 
European Court of Human Rights viewed the exercise of search 
powers at ports and airports as being excused by consent under 
Article 8.72 A wide catalogue of rights was considered in Beghal v. 
DPP.73 As the wife of a convicted terrorist, Djamel Beghal, the 
cause of her examination was evident under Article 5. Her Article 8 
complaint was not sustained because the surveillance of airport 
travellers is intrinsic to contemporary travel. An Article 6 
complaint was also dismissed since criminal proceedings were not 
                                                
62 Hansard (House of Commons) Public Bill Committee col.456 (9 July 2013), 
Damian Green. 
63 Hansard (House of Lords) vol.750, col.807 (11 December 2013); Hansard 
(House of Lords) vol.751, col.497 (20 January 2014); Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: ANTI–SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, CRIME 
AND POLICING BILL (2013–14 HL 56/HC 713) paras.112, 123, 125. 
64 Hansard (House of Lords) vol.750, col.810 (11 December 2013). 
65 See Home Office, MEMORANDUM ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (London, 2013) paras.192, 193. 
66 App. No.4158/05, 12 January 2010, para. 187. 
67 [2013] EWHC 2573. 
68 Miranda v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 255, paras.82, 88. 
69 See Gillan and Quinton v. United Kingdom, App No.4158/05, 12 January 2010, 
para. 64; Gahramanov v. Azerbaijan, App. No.26291/06, 7 November 2013. 
70 McVeigh, O’Neill, and Evans v. United Kingdom, App. Nos.8022, 8025, 8027/77; 
DR 18 p 66 (admissibility), DR 25 p 15 (final report). See R. Clayton and H. 
Tomlinson, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009) para. 10.183. 
71 App. Nos.11539, 11641, 11650, 11651, 11652/85, Ser A Vol.324 (1981). 
72 A further challenge is pending in Malik v. United Kingdom, App. No.32968/11. 
73 [2013] EWHC 2573. 
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contemplated and certainly none based on her answers. The 
Miranda case underlines that the journalistic materials under 
Article 10 may yet prove problematic, given that no express 
recognition is given to special procedure materials or legal privilege. 
Assessing the application of port controls to journalism in the 
Miranda case, it must be concluded that the special laws were rather 
strained, as recognised initially by the Security Service and the 
police. A power to examine and search for materials the possession 
of which is contrary to United Kingdom law would offer a more 
suitable legal vehicle and a wider power of intervention than rules 
as to import and export (such as weapons) or as to customs dues.74 
Materials held in breach of official secrets laws could thereby be 
protected. A less ambitious legal reform would be to insert within 
the port controls recognition of journalistic privilege, though, as 
already indicated, this proposal was specifically rejected by 
Parliament. 
§ 2 – DEMAND FOR INFORMATION 
Cooperation between police and media is ingrained in both low 
and high policing.75 There are two common modes of engagement. 
The principal mode of relationship is managerial. In this mode, the 
police, albeit that they are powerful initiators in criminal justice and 
can wield coercive powers, are concerned with news management 
- how information is released and understood through negotiation 
and interaction. Underlying this approach is a high degree of 
cooperation and mutual reliance between police and media, as well 
as recognition by the police of the independence and important 
roles of the media. As a consequence, many previous researchers 
have found that there is often a stable and productive relationship 
between the police and crime reporters.76 Thus, there is “a sense of 
dependency between police and members of the media, uneasy 
                                                
74 There exists a broad power to ‘rummage’ in the prevention of smuggling under 
the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s.27. For import and export 
controls, see Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954, SI 1954/23; Import and 
Export Control Act 1990; Export Control Act 2002; Export Control Order 
2008, SI 2008/3231; Z. Yihdego and A. Savage, The UK arms export regime [2008] 
PUBLIC LAW 546.  
75 See C. Walker, The police and the mass media in emergencies (2011) 1 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REVIEW 15. 
76 P. Schlesinger and H. Tumber, REPORTING CRIME; THE MEDIA POLITICS OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994); R.V. Ericson, CRIME AND 
THE MEDIA (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1995); D. Kidd-Hewitt and 
R. Osborne, (eds), CRIME AND THE MEDIA: THE POST MODERN SPECTACLE 
(Pluto Press, London, 1995); D. Howitt, CRIME, THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 
(Wiley, London, 1998); S. Chibnall, LAW AND ORDER NEWS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CRIME REPORTING IN THE BRITISH PRESS (Routledge, London, 2001); M. 
Wykes, NEWS, CRIME AND CULTURE (Pluto Press, London, 2001); R.C. Mawby, 
POLICING IMAGE: POLICING COMMUNICATION AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN 
BRITAIN (Willan, Cullompton, 2002); F. Leishman and P. Mason, POLICING 
AND THE MEDIA: FACTS, FICTIONS AND FACTIONS, Willan, Cullompton, 2003).  
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though this may be at times.”77 While the police may sometimes 
seek to manipulate media coverage of their image and work,78 at 
the same time the police depend on the media for the regular 
conveyance of messages to the public and also at times utilise the 
media as an investigative resource.79 In turn, journalists depend 
upon the police for primary information. It is difficult to be 
conclusive about which side acts as primary information-
gatekeepers. Without hard law to regulate self-serving 
relationships, temptations to give and take may arise and have 
indeed been at the heart of inquiries into press conduct in relation 
to telephone tapping and other breaches of privacy in the United 
Kingdom in recent years.80 One major impact was the closure of 
the News of the World newspaper in 2011. Journalists have also been 
convicted of breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,81 while their police 
collaborators have also been convicted of corruption.82 
The second mode for police-media relations is coercive. In certain 
circumstances, the police can coerce the media into action or 
inaction through the application of legal powers. One such 
application might involve the use of the media as surrogate 
investigators and information sources. This mode of relationship 
is not common in the United Kingdom. Freedom of the press is 
accorded a high value in United Kingdom constitutional law, as 
evidenced by the special protection for “freedom of expression” in 
section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, building upon the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 1950, Article 10. Nevertheless, the coercive demand 
for information may arise under threat of legal powers or under the 
actual invocation of legal powers. In either case, there is a strong 
element of coercion and threat.  
This modality arose in the Miranda case. On 20 July 2013, even 
before the Heathrow Airport incident (which occurred on 18 
                                                
77 F. Leishman and P. Mason, POLICING AND THE MEDIA: FACTS, FICTIONS 
AND FACTIONS, Willan, Cullompton, 2003) p.31. 
78 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, POLICE AND THE MEDIA 
(2008-09 HC 75), para. 29. 
79 M. Innes, The media as an investigative resource in police murder enquiries, (1999) 39 
BRITISH JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 269. 
80 See Information Commissioner, WHAT PRICE PRIVACY? THE UNLAWFUL 
TRADE IN CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION (Wilmslow, 2006), WHAT 
PRICE PRIVACY NOW? THE FIRST SIX MONTHS PROGRESS IN HALTING THE 
UNLAWFUL TRADE IN CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION (Wilmslow, 
2006); Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press, Report (2012-13 
HC 1213); House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, News 
International and Phone Hacking (2010-12 HC 903); House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committe, Unauthorised tapping into or hacking of mobile communications (2010-
12, HC 907) and Government Response (Cm 8182, London, 2011) ; House of 
Commons Committee of Privileges, First Special Report, Matter of Privilege 
referred to the Committee on 22 May 2012 (2014-14 HC 1068). 
81 Examples include Clive Goodman (2007); and Dan Evans, Graham Johnson, 
Ian Edmondson, Neville Thurlbeck, Greg Miskiw, James Weatherup, and Andy 
Coulson (2014).  
82 See Alan King and Paul Marshall (2005); April Casburn 2013.  
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August 2013) but revealed after that event, The Guardian disclosed 
that GCHQ had forced the newspaper to destroy Snowden-related 
documents or face legal action. They were informed by the 
authorities, “You’ve had your fun. Now we want the stuff back.”83 
The materials were held in the basement of the newspaper’s offices. 
In the presence of GCHQ technicians, a senior editor and a 
Guardian computer expert used angle grinders and drills to 
“pulverise the hard drives and memory chips on which the 
encrypted files had been stored”.84 It was appreciated that the 
destruction was a show of force, because all parties knew that other 
copies of the data were held elsewhere – in Russia, the U.S., Brazil, 
and China. But the authorities wanted this destruction to take place 
to ensure the security of sensitive data within the United Kingdom 
at least. The newspaper complied, fearing either a civil injunction 
or criminal proceedings under the Official Secrets Act. In the 
event, they chose to destroy the documents rather than hand them 
over so as to avoid any extraneous markings and also to avoid 
revealing the extent of their catalogue. 
If the obliteration of journalistic materials under threat of legal 
action does not sound drastic enough, more legalistic processes can 
be actually invoked. Again, this approach is not a novel, and legal 
activities in connection with infractions of the Official Secrets Acts 
have already been noted. But demands for information are 
becoming firmly attached to counter terrorism operations, as 
revealed in two ways. 
The first aspect concerns the use of special search powers in 
Schedule 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Schedule 5 offers variants 
upon Schedule 1 of the mainstream policing legislation (namely, 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 – “PACE”). The main 
differences are the triggering criteria, which relate to “terrorist 
investigations” rather than to specified offences, and the more 
extensive powers so triggered. The catalogue includes powers to 
enter premises, to search the premises or any person found there, 
and to seize and retain any relevant material. By Schedule 5, 
paragraph 1(1): “A constable may apply to a justice of the peace for 
the issue of a warrant under this paragraph for the purposes of a 
terrorist investigation.” The premises to be targeted may be 
particular (for a “specific premises warrant”) or, following 
amendment by the Terrorism Act 2006, section 26, they may 
comprise any or sets of premises occupied or controlled by a 
person specified in the application (an “all premises warrant”).85 
“Excepted material” may not be the subject of an application, and 
that term is defined in paragraph 4 by reference to corresponding 
                                                
83 A Rusbridger, David Miranda, schedule 7 and the danger that all reporters now face, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-
schedule7-danger-reporters, 20 August 2013. 
84 NSA files: why the Guardian in London destroyed hard drives of leaked files 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/nsa-snowden-files-drives-
destroyed-london. 
85 A warrant may incorporate both formats: Redknapp v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [2008] EWHC 1177 (Admin). 
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PACE exceptions. These comprise “excluded material” (under 
section 11 of PACE, which includes journalistic material which a 
person holds in confidence and which consists of documents or of 
records other than documents.), “special procedure material” 
(under section 14 of PACE, which includes all other journalistic 
material, other than excluded material) and “items subject to legal 
privilege” (under section 10 of PACE). Journalistic material is 
defined in section 13 of PACE:86 
“(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, in this Act ‘journalistic 
material’ means material acquired or created for the 
purposes of journalism. 
(2) Material is only journalistic material for the purposes of 
this Act if it is in the possession of a person who acquired 
or created it for the purposes of journalism. 
(3) A person who receives material from someone who 
intends that the recipient shall use it for the purposes of 
journalism is to be taken to have acquired it for those 
purposes.”  
In the light of these exceptions, the Terrorism Act 2000 search 
powers have not been recorded as being used against journalists, 
but an attempt to secure information from The Guardian and The 
Observer about possible breaches of official secrets legislation was 
made in R v. Central Criminal Court, ex parte Bright.87 A decade and a 
half ago, the judgment emphasized the value of journalism:88 
“... Premises are not to be entered by the forces of authority 
or the State to deter or diminish, inhibit or stifle the 
exercise of an individual’s right to free speech or the press 
of its freedom to investigate and inform… Inconvenient or 
embarrassing revelations, whether for the Security Services, 
or for public authorities, should not be suppressed.” 
More threatening is the next investigative power, under Schedule 5, 
paragraph 5, which deals with the production of, or access to, 
(rather than the physical search for) “excluded” and “special 
procedure” materials. By paragraph 8, only legally privileged 
material is wholly exempted from the clutches of paragraph 5. By 
paragraph 5(1), a constable may apply to a circuit judge for a 
production order to access excluded or special procedure material 
(including, under paragraph 7, material coming into existence 
within 28 days) for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. There 
is no requirement that notice be given to the possessor of the 
materials or that the material must be potential “evidence” for a 
court case. If granted, the order may require under paragraph 5(3) 
a specified person normally within seven days: (a) to produce to a 
constable within a specified period for seizure and retention any 
relevant material; (b) to give a constable access to relevant material 
within a specified period; and (c) to state to the best of his 
                                                
86 See R v. Crown Court at Bristol, ex p Bristol Press and Picture Agency Ltd (1986) 85 
Cr App Rep 190, DC (press photographs of riots were special procedure 
material). 
87 [2001] 1 W.L.R. 662 (DC). 
88 Ibid., paras. 97, 98. 
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knowledge and belief the location of relevant material if it is not in, 
and will not come into, his possession, custody, or power within 
the period specified under (a) or (b). An order may also require any 
other person who appears to the judge to be entitled to grant entry 
to the premises to allow entry and access. The circuit judge may 
grant an order if “satisfied” of two criteria in paragraph 6. The first 
condition relates to the relevance to the purposes of a terrorist 
investigation as well as the need for “reasonable grounds for 
believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value”. The 
second condition demands reasonable grounds for believing that it 
is in the public interest that the material should be produced. Under 
paragraph 10, the order is treated as if it were an order of the 
Crown Court and can be enforced by contempt of court powers.89 
Much of the consequent litigation has related to journalistic 
materials.90 In R v. Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court, ex parte Salinger,91 
the police sought from the prominent U.S. journalist, Pierre 
Salinger, and his employers records of interviews conducted in 
Libya with the two prime suspects of the Lockerbie bombing in 
1988. On the initial ex parte application, the High Court held that 
the police should provide to the judge a written statement of the 
material evidence, including the nature of the available information 
subject to secrecy and sensitivity, and the applicant police officer 
should appear before the judge to provide oral evidence. The judge 
could then decide on the grant of the order and also on what 
information might be served on the recipients. In turn, the 
recipients will rarely be notified until the service of the order,92 
when they are entitled to be given, preferably in writing, as much 
information as could properly be provided as to the grounds for 
the order but it would rarely be appropriate or necessary for 
disclosure of the source or details. Their subsequent application to 
discharge or vary should be made to the same judge with the same 
police officer who gave oral evidence being present. On this 
application, the judge can reconsider the order afresh on its merits, 
and there is no onus on the recipient to satisfy the judge that the 
order was wrongly made. It was later revealed that ABC News had 
agreed to comply because the order did not require the disclosure 
of confidential sources.93 
Journalistic material was again investigated in 1991 when Box 
Productions compiled a television programme, broadcast by 
Channel 4, which alleged collusion between members of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary and Loyalist terrorists which was presided 
over by a secret committee of prominent people. The police sought 
the production of documents connected with the programme. A 
                                                
89 See further Criminal Procedure Rules 2013 SI 2013/1554, rr 6.6, 6.7, 6.13. Ex 
parte hearings may arise under rr 6.3(3), 6.12. 
90 See also In re request from the United Kingdom (2013) 718 F 3d 13. 
91 [1993] QB 564. 
92 See further Re Morris [2003] NICC 11. But appearance might be allowed in 
difficult and complex cases involving the media: para. 35. 
93 See W.E. Schmidt, British TV station defies order to identify source New York 
Times 3 May 1992 p. 10. 
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redacted dossier of material was handed over, but it was claimed 
that further sensitive material had either been destroyed or 
removed from the jurisdiction and that the only person who knew 
the whereabouts of the material was a researcher employed by Box 
Productions. The judge then directed that the material sent abroad 
should be brought back and produced to the police. The 
respondents refused to comply. The Divisional Court, which could 
not review the judge’s order, imposed a fine of £75,000 for 
contempt.94 
In Re Moloney’s Application,95 the Northern Ireland editor of the 
Sunday Tribune newspaper was required to produce notes of an 
interview with William Stobie, who was later accused of the murder 
of lawyer Patrick Finucane.96 Quashing the Recorder’s order, the 
High Court stated:97 
“… the police have in our view to show something more 
than a possibility that the material will be of some use. They 
must establish that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value 
to the investigation.” 
In Re Jordan,98 the police sought materials from a BBC Panorama 
programme, Gangsters at War, which transmitted an announcement 
by a masked man on behalf of the Ulster Freedom Fighters. He 
was identified through voice analysis as Dennis Cunningham.99 
Any arguments about the chilling effect of disclosure on the ability 
to carry out investigative journalism were outweighed in the view 
of the Crown Court in Belfast by “the unmasking of terrorists and 
bringing them to justice”.100 By contrast, the BBC escaped 
compulsory disclosure by the Belfast Recorder’s Court of 
unbroadcast film of a Republican parade in Londonderry in 2011 
in which a masked man read out a speech on behalf of the Real 
IRA.101 The police’s claim that the extra footage would aid 
identification was rejected under Schedule 5, paragraph 5, because 
no “substantial value” had been established by the police, though 
the court made clear that if the police had met the standard of 
proof, then the public interest would have outweighed claims by 
the media of increased risks in news-gathering. 
In Malik v. Manchester Crown Court,102 a production order was 
granted in relation to a book manuscript written about Hassan 
Butt, entitled, Leaving Al-Qaeda. The police believed materials 
                                                
94 DPP v. Channel 4 & Box Productions [1993] 2 All ER 517. See further R Costigan, 
Further dispatches (1992) 142 NEW LAW JOURNAL 1417; S. McPhilemey, THE 
COMMITTEE (Roberts Rinehart, Boulder, 1999); McPhilemy v. Times Newspapers 
Ltd and others (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 933. 
95 [2000] NIJB 195. 
96 See Sir D. de Silva, REPORT OF THE PATRICK FINUCANE REVIEW (2012–13 
HC 802). 
97 [2000] NIJB 195, p 207. 
98 [2003] NICC 17. 
99 See for his conviction: R v. Cunningham [2005] NICC 45. 
100 [2003] NICC 1, para 21 per Judge Hart. 
101 BBC v. PSNI [2012] NICty 1. 
102 [2008] EWHC 1362 (Admin). 
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possessed by Malik, who helped to write the book, might disclose 
evidence of crimes by Butt. It was held that “likely” under 
paragraph 6(2)(b) demanded a high standard – “probable”; but 
“substantial value” required only a value more than minimal.103 
Being “satisfied” required a firm belief rather than a suspicion.104 
On review, the grant of the order was upheld, though the terms 
were altered. The High Court indicated that a court could of its 
own motion appoint a special advocate to appear at the ex parte 
hearing or on an application for variation or discharge, but only in 
exceptional cases.105 
In Re Galloway, the Police Service of Northern Ireland sought 
records and materials from the Northern Editor of the Sunday 
Tribune newspaper relating to claims of responsibility for the 
murders by Republican dissidents of two soldiers in 2009.106 The 
application was refused. The Court endorsed the approach that the 
public interest in the investigation and prosecution of serious crime 
is important, so the level of proof of overriding interests must 
attain a very high threshold of a substantial risk — in this case the 
threat to the right to life (Article 2 of the Convention) of the 
journalist and her family. That standard was met by the journalist. 
Two issues not yet adequately litigated are, first whether 
compliance with the production order might involve forcible self-
incrimination contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It was indicated in R v. Central Criminal Court, ex 
parte Bright107 that the statutory powers of production override the 
right against self-incrimination.  
privilege against self-incrimination. The same view was adopted for 
the powers of examination in Beghal which involve a non-criminal 
suspicionless stop rather than an interrogation following arrest 
with a view to criminal proceedings, even though responses might 
yield information of evidential value.108  
The production of physical materials with an existence 
independent of the will of the defendant has been treated as 
distinct from demanding information from the knowledge of the 
defendant.109 The second factor to be considered is the impact of 
section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires 
“particular regard” for the importance of freedom of expression 
before any order is granted. 
Should a production order under paragraph 5 be viewed as 
inappropriate for the purposes of the investigation, then under 
paragraph 11, a constable may apply to a circuit judge (or in 
Northern Ireland, a Crown Court judge) for the issuance of a 
                                                
103 Ibid., para 36. 
104 Ibid., para 37. 
105 Ibid., para 99. 
106 [2009] NICty 8. 
107 [2001] 1 W.L.R. 662 (DC). 
108 Beghal v. DPP [2013] EWHC 2573 (Admin), paras.127-129. Appeal to the UK 
Supreme Court is pending. 
109 See O’Halloran and Francis v. United Kingdom, App Nos. 15809/02, 25624/02, 
29 June 2007. 
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warrant to permit entry, search, and seizure. This variant procedure 
may be selected where, under paragraph 12, a circuit judge is 
satisfied that a production order has not been complied with or 
where satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing 
there is present material likely to be of substantial value but that it 
is not appropriate to proceed by way of production order (perhaps 
because it would tip off a potential collaborator). 
Another type of investigative power is ancillary to the foregoing. 
By Schedule 5, paragraph 13, a constable may apply to a circuit 
judge (or in Northern Ireland, a Crown Court judge) for an order 
requiring any person specified in the order to provide an 
explanation of any material seized, produced, or made available 
under paragraphs 1, 5, or 11.110 There is no equivalent to this 
invasive power in PACE 1984. There is no immunity against 
revealing information concerning other excepted materials. It is an 
offence under paragraph 14 knowingly or recklessly to make a false 
or misleading statement. By paragraph 13(4)(b), and in deference 
to Article 6, a statement in response to a requirement imposed by 
an order under this paragraph may be used in evidence against the 
maker only on a prosecution for an offence under paragraph 14 
but not for other offences.111 There is no recorded use against a 
journalist. 
The increasing usage of Schedule 5 reveals an official willingness 
to treat journalism as an available resource for the provision of 
journalistic information in pursuit of criminal justice purposes but 
without much emphasis (beyond that stated in ex parte Bright in 
2001) for other public interests such as a free and fearless press. 
The relative success of the tactic seems to have emboldened the 
police, especially in Northern Ireland, and so this second tactic of 
confrontation of journalism is now being rolled out on a global 
scale. This new front has become more feasible after 9/11, when 
the tendency to treat terrorism cases as “political offences” and 
therefore not subject to international comity has tended to fall 
away, especially in the case of the U.S. authorities.112 The point is 
illustrated by litigation around the Boston College tapes.113 
The “Belfast Project” began in 2001 as an oral history of the 
Northern Ireland Troubles. It was directed by journalist Ed 
Moloney, with the fieldwork being conducted by recorded by 
Wilson McArthur (for Loyalists) and Anthony McIntyre (for 
Republicans). The collection was to form a repository in the Burns 
Library at Boston College, thereby benefiting from full U.S. First 
Amendment rights and a degree of distance (so it was thought) 
                                                
110 See Criminal Procedure Rules 2013, rr.6.8, 6.13. 
111 See Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No.19187/91, 1996-VI; IJL v. United 
Kingdom, App. Nos.29522/95, 30056/96, 30574/96, 2000-IX. 
112 For changing attitudes regarding extradition, see G. Gilbert, TRANSNATIONAL 
FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998) 
chap.6; C. Walker, TERRORISM AND THE LAW (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011) chap.6. 
113 See for background https://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/; B. McMurtrie, 
Secrets from Belfast (http://chronicle.com/article/Secrets-from-Belfast/144059/, 2014). 
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from the prying eyes of the British authorities. A key objective was 
to capture the views of live participants as a research resource and 
also part of the eventual process of transitional justice through 
account-giving. Various former loyalist and republican 
paramilitaries gave candid interviews that chronicled their 
involvement in the Troubles. They were promised that the 
recordings and transcripts would only be made public after their 
deaths. Amongst those interviewed were David Ervine of the 
Progressive Unionist Party, and the former IRA commander 
Brendan Hughes (who died in 2007 and 2008 respectively), and 
some details were revealed in a book by Ed Moloney,114 and a 
television documentary broadcast by Raidió Teilifís Éireann in 
2010.115 It was probably naïve, arrogant, or both to suppose that 
the authorities would look the other way. Accordingly, the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) took action, after hearing 
claims in the published statements of Hughes that the Sinn Féin 
leader, Gerry Adams, had been overall commander of the IRA’s 
Belfast brigade and that he had been involved in a unit responsible 
for the “Disappeared” - those who were kidnapped, murdered and 
secretly buried by the IRA.116 Though denied by Adams, another 
prominent Republican participant in the “Belfast Project”, Dolours 
Price, who died in 2013, also gave information about her 
involvement in driving one of the “Disappeared”, Jean McConville 
to the place where she was murdered by the IRA in 1972.117  
In March 2011, the PSNI began a legal bid in the U.S. to gain access 
to the interviews held by Boston College. Its investigation took the 
form of a request to the U.S. Department of Justice to initiate 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty proceedings by issuing a sealed 
subpoena for all materials relating to two interviews in the archive, 
those of Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price.118 Boston College 
sought to quash the subpoena.119 In August, 2011, a second 
subpoena was served seeking “any and all interviews containing 
information about the abduction and death of Mrs. Jean 
McConville.”120 This was also opposed by the Belfast Project, 
including on the political argument that the Attorney General 
“should take cognisance of solemn promises made by the U.K. 
Government to the U.S. Senate that it would not reopen issues 
                                                




116 See Northern Ireland (Location of Victims Remains) Act 1999: 
http://www.iclvr.ie/. 
117 In August 2003, her remains were found by chance at Shelling Hill beach in 
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addressed in the Belfast Agreement, or [ ] impede any further 
efforts to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland.”121 
In December, 2011, Judge William G. Young recognised that 
“subpoenae targeting confidential academic information deserve 
heightened scrutiny” but still ruled against both Boston College’s 
motions to quash the subpoenas and Moloney and McIntyre’s 
motion to intervene.122 His proposal was to review the archives in 
camera, but this exercise was stayed pending an appeal to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals.123 The First Circuit Court of Appeals gave 
judgment on the first subpoena on 6 July 2013, upholding Judge 
Young’s ruling.124 Any First Amendment challenge was rejected on 
grounds that there were no private rights under these international 
law arrangements and there was no judicial review of actions under 
a treaty. A stay was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court,125 but 
certiorari was denied in 2013.126 The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled on Boston College’s appeal and motions on 31 May 2013. 
The Court was critical of the breadth of the application and 
reduced the amount of material to be handed over from 85 
interviews (out of 176 relevant interviews in total) to segments of 
11 interviews.127 But, at the same time, it crucially found that a 
promise of confidentiality by a researcher did not create a First 
Amendment bar.128 The U.S. Attorney’s application for a rehearing 
was denied.129  
In 2015, arrangements were made for sealed tapes to be sent to the 
Royal Courts of Justice in Belfast. At least three legal consequences 
have ensued. First, Richard O’Rawe has threatened to sue Boston 
College after it handed over parts of his interviews. He claims 
breach of contract:130  
“Mr. O’Rawe told of his career in the Provos to Boston College 
researchers on strict conditions contained in a ‘donor contract’ 
with the college. It stated that ‘access to the tapes and transcripts 
shall be restricted until after my death except in those cases where 
                                                










124 United States v. Moloney (In re Price), 685 F.3d 1 (1st circ Mass 6 July 2012). 
125 Moloney v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 9 (U.S., 2012). 
126 Moloney v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1796, 185 L. Ed. 2d 856 (U.S., 2013). 
127 U.S. v. Trustees of Boston College, 718 F.3d 13(1st circ Mass 31 May 2013). 
Compare the previous assessment of Judge Young: U.S. v. Trustees of Boston 
College, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6516 (20 January 2012) 
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I have provided prior written approval’. However, the contract 
didn’t specify that the secrecy of the archive was limited under 
American law.” 
Second, and even before the tapes had arrived, the police arrested 
Gerry Adams in May 2014 regarding his alleged role in the 
disappearance of Jean McConville. Adams was released without 
charge, and the then PSNI Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, rejected 
“claim there were ‘dark’ elements opposed to the peace process 
behind his detention”.131 
Third, and with the tapes now arriving on the doorstep of the 
United Kingdom jurisdiction, a number of interviewees are no 
doubt feeling distinctly uncomfortable. One such interviewee is 
Winston Rea, who was a member of the Red Hand Commando 
and who had provided testimony to the Belfast Project. Rea 
brought legal proceedings in Belfast to stop police from listening 
to the tapes. His counsel argued that prosecuting authorities were 
acting on a hunch rather than any firm knowledge that the tapes 
contain information relevant to any investigation and that the 
operative legislation, section 7(5) of the Crime (International 
Cooperation) Act 2003, breached Rea’s right to privacy under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, article 8. After the 
application was rejected in the High Court, the PSNI officers 
travelled to Boston for the purpose of taking possession of the 
tapes. On 27 February 2015, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal 
rejected the appeal.132 The DPP argued that the standard to be 
established was simply that the evidence should be “for use” in the 
proceedings or investigation rather than that it must be of 
“substantial value”. Given that the legal test applied by the USA in 
such cases was that of “probable cause”, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
decision showed that sufficient grounds were made out for the 
material to be subpoenaed. The DPP also argued that there was a 
duty to protect life under Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to investigate murder in the interests of victims and 
the general public. Lord Justice Coghlin accepted that the material 
could properly be subpoenaed in connection with the investigation 
stage and that, as a consequence the PSNI do not have to identify 
specific aspects of the recordings which are relevant to the offences 
being investigated other than they purport to be an account of 
terrorist activities carried out by the Red Hand Commando of 
which the PSNI hold prior information, as noted in the letter of 
request to the USA authorities, indicating that Rea was an active 
member. The standard specified in the 2003 Act for the grounds 
upon which the evidence is considered to be relevant for the 
purpose of a request for mutual assistance is that it is for “use in 
the proceedings or investigation”. Such evidence could not be of 
use if it was irrelevant but that was very far from reading into the 
                                                
131 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/06/gerry-adams-arrest-
defended-northern-ireland-police-chief. The quote is from Sinn Féin MP, 
Martin McGuinness. 
132 Rea’s (Winston Churchill) Application [2015] NICA 8. 
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2003 Act any particular standard of relevance. Finally, any 
infringement of privacy would be covered by the exceptions in 
Article 8(2) to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Though the judgment was decisively in their favour, before the 
PSNI could take away the tapes, the court ordered on that the 
material remained sealed pending an appeal to the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court. 
In conclusion, this second round of intrusions into journalistic 
activities in order to support police and prosecution activities do 
again have the tendencies to downplay the wider public interest 
attributes of journalism and also produce a chilling effect on the 
journalists and their sources. The only silver lining compared to the 
first round of intrusions (and the third round to follow) is that the 
courts tend to be heavily involved in the supervision of these 
interventions. As a result, while savings for journalistic purposes 
are often absent from the operative laws, the judges are alert to the 
issues under articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, though, as shown in the Boston Project cases, its 
standards are relatively weak, albeit that apparently stronger U.S. 
standards on free speech did not make much difference. 
§ 3 – DUTY TO INFORM PROACTIVELY 
The foregoing mode of imposition upon journalism in the interests 
of counter terrorism demands action at the behest of the police. 
This third mode of imposition seeks to bypass police initiative. 
After all, why should journalists wait for a call if their information 
can save lives and if the police are unaware who possesses juicy 
information in order to make a request? Better still to confer a 
general legal duty on everyone to inform without asking. Such a 
general duty would have particular purchase on journalism by 
recognising the forensic abilities of some journalists to obtain and 
analyse information which may sometimes exceed police 
capabilities in two ways. First, they may be able to carry out 
investigations not permissible in the case of the police because of 
threshold requirements as to action or limitations on investigative 
techniques. Second, journalistic activity may be unencumbered by 
the finances of the police in an age of austerity.133 So, the objective 
under this third heading is to make journalists duty-bound to serve 
up information about terrorism and not simply potential resources 
for search warrants or other forms of police-initiated investigation. 
The media must therefore turn themselves into self-tasking 
policing bodies. 
This insidious duty has been conferred by the Terrorism Act 2000, 
section 38B.134 The offence is committed under section 38B(2) if a 
                                                
133 See C. Walker and A. Staniforth, The amplification and melding of counter-terrorism 
agencies in A. Masferrer and C. Walker, (eds.), COUNTER-TERRORISM, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: CROSSING LEGAL BOUNDARIES IN DEFENCE 
OF THE STATE (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013). 
134 See C. Walker, Conscripting the public in terrorism policing: towards safer communities 
or a police state? [2010] CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 441; C. Walker, THE ANTI-
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person, without reasonable excuse, fails to disclose information 
falling within section 38B(1), which is information which he knows 
or believes might be of material assistance in preventing the 
commission by another person of an act of terrorism, or in securing 
the apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of another person, in 
the United Kingdom, for an offence involving the commission, 
preparation, or instigation of an act of terrorism. This special duty 
has existed in various guises since 1976, while in Northern Ireland 
it is also an offence under section 5 in the Criminal Law Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1967 to fail to give information known or 
believed likely to secure, or to be of material assistance in securing, 
the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person for an 
arrestable offence which has been committed. Section 38B is 
different in that the information must relate to “terrorism” rather 
than an “arrestable offence” and may concern future as well as past 
activities. Nevertheless, the considerable overlap between 
section 38B and section 5(1) convinced the Baker Report to 
propose the repeal of section 5(1) as applied to “terrorist” 
offences.135 
By section 38B(4), it is a defence for a person charged with an 
offence to prove a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure. 
The defence of reasonable excuse will often relate to fears of 
reprisal or reaction going beyond the defence of duress.136 Do 
journalists have a “reasonable excuse” to disregard this legal duty? 
A reporter may discover information about terrorism by 
interviewing a terrorist leader or by witnessing a paramilitary 
display. Arranging, attending, or reporting such events may 
implicate the journalist in various offences (especially attending a 
place of training under the Terrorism Act 2006, section 8), but 
section 38B can involve two further impacts. First, the offence 
contributes to a “chilling” effect on the reporting of terrorism. 
Correspondents can expect close attention from the police and 
hostility and special restrictions from their own superiors. Thus, 
coverage of Irish terrorism abounded with difficulties and was to 
some extent suppressed as “guilty secrets”.137 The second effect is 
the direct threat of prosecution where insufficient weight is given 
in section 38B to investigative journalism.138 Such a threat occurred 
in 1979 and related to a BBC interview with an INLA 
representative and then the filming (but not transmission) of an 
IRA road-block in Carrickmore. Both events incurred the wrath of 
the Attorney-General, who issued a warning to the BBC on the 20 
June 1980 that the incidents were of a nature “as constituting in 
                                                
TERRORISM LEGISLATION (3rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 
chap.4. 
135 Review of the Operation of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act 1978 (Cmnd.9222, London, 1984) para. 253. 
136 See R v. Sherif and others [2008] EWCA Crim 2653, para. 53. 
137 L. Curtis, IRELAND: THE PROPAGANDA WAR (Pluto Press, London, 1984) p 
275. 
138 See C.P. Walker, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (2nd ed., 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992) pp.141–3. 
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principle offences…”.139 Despite the threat, no prosecution has 
ensued. 
There is no express exception for the media under section 38B, but 
the coercion or sanctioning of journalists is subject to article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights which applies two 
restraints. The more general is that the highest priority is given to 
the encouragement of journalism involving political speech.140 The 
second aspect of protection is against legal incursions which 
demand the revelation of sensitive journalistic sources or 
confidences.141 
In summary, despite the untrammeled breadth of its terms, some 
restraint has been applied in the usage of section 38B. It serves as 
a threat rather than the basis for making martyrs out of journalists 
who, on the evidence of the contempt cases arising from 
schedule 5 may not be easily convinced to divulge source material. 
However, the looming threat of prosecution certainly shifts the 
balance of power in the generally cooperative relations between 
media and police described earlier. 
Section 38B was devised in the days of the IRA, when, 
geographically and tactically, a more confined conflict was played 
out between contestants who deeply understood each other. Now, 
the perception is of “new” terrorism142 which applies such global 
savagery that the old restraints of section 38B may also appear 
outmoded and weak. Another factor to take into account is prolific 
storage and dissemination of data through the internet. As a result, 
there is increasing pressure on communication service providers 
both to impose restraints on their customers and also to keep the 
security authorities well informed about nefarious customer 
activities. Furthermore, these duties are very broadly pitched to 
apply not just to intelligence about offences or potential offences 
but more generally to extremism and radicalization. 
These extraordinary demands, which have not been made of other 
media, were made explicit in the United Kingdom in connection 
with the murder of Lee Rigby, a British Army soldier, on 22 May 
2013. Those convicted, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, 
drove their car at him and then attempted to behead him.143 It 
emerged that Adebolajo was detained under the Terrorism 
Act 2000, Schedule 7, after deportation on security grounds from 
Kenya in 2010 but that no further action was taken other than 
(allegedly) to recruit him as an informant. Aside from these 
convictions, much of the focus of subsequent inquiries has 
concentrated on whether the murder could have been prevented, 
                                                
139 THE TIMES, 2 August 1980 p. 2; L. Curtis, IRELAND: THE PROPAGANDA WAR 
(Pluto Press, London, 1984) pp.169-170. 
140 Castells v. Spain, App. No.11798/85, Ser. A vol.236 (1992). 
141 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No.17488/90 (1996), para.  39.  
142 See B. Lia, GLOBALISATION AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM (Routledge, 
London, 2005); P. Neumann, OLD AND NEW TERRORISM (Polity, Cambridge, 
2009). 
143 R v. Adebolajo and Adbowale, THE TIMES, 19 December 2013 pp. 1, 7, [2014] 
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and two candidate organizations have been under the spotlight – 
the security agencies and the communications service providers. 
Much more blame has been attached to the latter than the former.  
For instance, an Extremism Task Force, formed by the Prime 
Minister after the killing of Lee Rigby, reported in late 2013.144 One 
of its findings was that “Extremist propaganda is too widely 
available, particularly online, and has a direct impact on radicalising 
individuals. The poisonous messages of extremists must not be 
allowed to drown out the voices of the moderate majority.”145 
Action points which it claimed were “agreed” involved:146 
“· work with internet companies to restrict access to 
terrorist material online which is hosted overseas but illegal 
under U.K. law 
· improve the process for public reporting of extremist 
content online  
· work with the internet industry to help them in their 
continuing efforts to identify extremist content to include 
in family-friendly filters  
· look at using existing powers to exclude from the U.K. 
those who post extremist material online who are based 
overseas”  
Next, the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report on the 
intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby found that the 
security services investigated these individuals on several 
occasions, but nothing immediately threatening to life had turned 
up.147 The agencies knew of their extremism and wanted to use 
them as informants, especially as they could be pressured as a result 
of involvement in drug dealing. In short, the agencies acted 
properly within the resources available – a finding similar to the 
inquiries into the 7 July 2005 London bombings,148 even though it 
was clear that the Woolwich pair were of much higher profile than 
the 7/7 group. However, the Intelligence and Security Committee 
do criticize the security agencies in some respects: stronger alarm 
bells should ring when an individual recurrently becomes of 
interest; and the Security Intelligence Service must be more 
proactive and take a greater interest in the activities of cooperating 
foreign agencies, including allegations of misconduct.149 Yet the 
most trenchant criticism is made of the failure of internet 
companies (especially the unnamed Facebook)150 for their failure 
to be more forthcoming with information.  
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148 See Home Office, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London 
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Much of the subsequent media and political attention concentrated 
on the behaviour of Facebook. Several of Michael Adebowale’s 
multiple social media internet accounts were closed proactively by 
Facebook and without official request because “they hit 
triggers…related to their criteria for closing things down on the 
basis of terrorist content”.151 Facebook also learned, on completion 
of a retrospective review of all his 11 accounts,152 that Adebowale 
had discussed “in the most explicit and emotive manner” over 
Facebook’s instant messaging service his desire to murder a 
soldier.153 The ISC was nevertheless critical of monitoring 
procedures by CSPs,154 though serial investigations by the Security 
Service were excused as sufficiently thorough, especially because, 
as pointed out by GCHQ,155 true intent can be very difficult to 
discern from online communications. Thus, even if the offending 
messages had been passed on by Facebook to the security agencies, 
any reaction by them was far from assured and had been eschewed 
on several previous occasions. Though Facebook was not wholly 
forthcoming, their default raises two further jurisdictional issues. 
One is that their activities (based in the U.S.) are overseen by the 
U.S. security agencies; thus the Intelligence and Security 
Committee rather coyly referred to a “partner” foreign agency156 
but without asking whether it knew what was said on Facebook 
about killing a soldier and whether it consciously failed to pass on 
that information to the British agencies. A second jurisdictional 
point is that even in the case of clear default, any proactive legal 
duty would have limited impact on a company based in the U.S. 
and any attempt to subpoena information would be laborious (as 
shown by the Boston Project case). All the same, Sir Nigel 
Sheinwald has been appointed as Special Envoy on intelligence and 
law enforcement data sharing in order to secure better transatlantic 
data sharing.157 
Putting aside other relevant issues around data privacy, 
accountability for surveillance, the duty of care to users, and the 
economic efficiency, were social media companies to be legally 
obliged to proactively monitor and share all postings of a violent 
extremist nature with the security authorities, both would be 
deluged with information and rendered unable to function on an 
economic basis. Yet, the allure of blaming a foreign internet 
company rather than home security agencies for failing to avert 
atrocities seems hard to resist even though it is clear that the 
Woolwich murder revealed a failure of assessment (perhaps 
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understandable and excusable) rather than a crucial lack of 
information.158  
The new head of the Security Service, Andrew Parker, kept up the 
pressure in his first public speech in early January 2015 by 
emphasizing the need for powers to access and intercept 
communications.159 His call was soon followed by the 
Government’s reply to the Intelligence and Security Committee160 
which was adamant that: 
“… Communications Services Providers (CSPs) have a 
responsibility to ensure their networks are not used to plot 
terrorist attacks…. we are also pushing CSPs to take 
stronger, faster and further action to combat the use of 
their services by terrorists, criminals and their supporters. 
They are committed to measures that make it easier for 
their users and the authorities to report terrorist and 
extremist propaganda. We will build on this to encourage 
companies to work together to produce industry standards 
for the identification, removal and referral of terrorist 
activity.”  
By contrast, the government expressed itself “confident that MI5 
prioritises available resources and deploys them proportionately to 
the level of risk represented and as necessary to satisfactorily 
mitigate the risk, based on the information known at the time.” Yet 
it seems, by contrast, that CSPs are expected to perform to a higher 
duty of care with no margin for error or discretion: 
“Communications Services Providers (CSPs) have a 
responsibility to ensure their networks are not used to plot 
terrorist attacks.”161 A more realistic understanding is that 
even with extensive criminal offences, intrusion into free 
speech activities, the appointment of extra staff, and extra 
funding, not all terrorism will be averted. It is unrealistic to 
expect internet companies to act as better all-seeing and all-
doing state spies than the security agencies themselves. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The modes of treating journalists either as akin to terrorists or in 
some cases as akin to police officers are not new. The history of 
demands, threats, and prosecutions extends over several decades. 
But the adverse stances seem to be growing more prevalent and 
more insistent. Factors which might explain this trend have broadly 
been identified as reflecting two vectors. One relates to the 
perceived nature of terrorism. The “new” terrorism is seen as more 
threatening and therefore demands greater societal mobilization 
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and lower tolerance to risk. As a result, counter terrorism is allowed 
to transcend other values, including the expressive rights of 
journalists and the privacy rights of their sources. The other vector 
relates to the perceived nature of the journalism and the media. 
The official perception seems to be that the media have grown 
more powerful and should therefore be viewed as more threatening 
to the interests of counter-terrorism.  
Assuming that these trends of hostility to journalism have been 
established, what should be the reactions? Some international law 
authorities have expressed concern. In particular, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of 
American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information issued a Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and 
Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation in 2008 which 
proposed that:162 
“The definition of terrorism, at least as it applies in the context 
of restrictions on freedom of expression, should be restricted 
to violent crimes that are designed to advance an ideological, 
religious, political or organised criminal cause and to influence 
public authorities by inflicting terror on the public. 
The criminalisation of speech relating to terrorism should be 
restricted to instances of intentional incitement to terrorism, 
understood as a direct call to engage in terrorism which is 
directly responsible for increasing the likelihood of a terrorist 
act occurring, or to actual participation in terrorist acts (for 
example by directing them). Vague notions such as providing 
communications support to terrorism or extremism, the 
‘glorification’ or ‘promotion’ of terrorism or extremism, and 
the mere repetition of statements by terrorists, which does not 
itself constitute incitement, should not be criminalised. 
The role of the media as a key vehicle for realising freedom of 
expression and for informing the public should be respected 
in anti-terrorism and anti-extremism laws. The public has a 
right to know about the perpetration of acts of terrorism, or 
attempts thereat, and the media should not be penalised for 
providing such information. 
Normal rules on the protection of confidentiality of 
journalists’ sources of information – including that this should 
be overridden only by court order on the basis that access to 
the source is necessary to protect an overriding public interest 
or private right that cannot be protected by other means – 
should apply in the context of anti-terrorist actions as at other 
times.” 
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A more recent statement of devotion is the European Union’s 
Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression.163 By paragraph 31, 
 “States should protect by law the right of journalists not to 
disclose their sources (Unless justified by an overriding 
requirement in the public interest in conformity with 
international human rights law) in order to ensure that 
journalists can report on matters in the public interest 
without their sources fearing retribution.” Similar 
sentiments are made in paragraph regarding information 
and communication technologies. Annex 1 recognises that 
national security, and so “States must take care to ensure 
that anti-terrorism laws, treason laws or similar provisions 
relating to national security (state secrets laws, sedition 
laws, etc.) are crafted and applied in a manner that is in 
conformity with their obligations under international 
human rights law.” 
By contrast to this soft law, harder edged international law, such as 
the already mentioned UN Security Resolution 2178, has tended in 
the opposite direction, and ideas around offering more protection 
to journalists, including in conflict zones,164 have not been 
delivered.165  
Turning to domestic safeguards, broad constitutional statements of 
values, such as freedom of expression, have the virtues of coverage 
and importance, but they also reflect limits. Even the U.S. First 
Amendment did not forbid the rendition of the Boston Tapes and 
has also allowed the material support offences.166 Likewise, 
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights has 
proven relatively weak when challenged by operational 
requirements of counter-terrorism. Within the Human Rights Act 
1998, there is the further boost to freedom of expression given by 
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section 12 which was enacted to “tip the balance” in favour of 
expression.167 However, in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., 168 section 12(4) 
was not interpreted as according to Article 10 a presumptive 
priority over other rights.169 Despite its uncertain impacts, 
section 12(4) has been used as a precedent in the Counter 
Terrorism and Security Act 2015, section 31 for giving a special 
boost to freedom of speech in the application of the “Prevent” 
duty to universities. 
In the light of these experiences, it would seem that, if freedom of 
expression is to be better safeguarded against counter terrorism, 
then more specific savings must be inserted into specific policing 
and court powers. The precedent is the saving for excluded and 
special procedure journalistic material under sections 11, 13, and 
14 of PACE. The same idea is now being advanced in relation in 
the interception of communications data under the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications Act 2000.170 Special savings of 
this kind may in practical terms require a higher threshold for 
intervention against journalistic materials and/or may require a 
stricter level of authorization or supervision of the intervention – 
such as a judicial warrant. The same devices could be applied for 
instance in the Terrorism Act 2000, Schedules 5 and 7. Yet, these 
arguments have been repeatedly raised before the government and 
Parliament and have been repeatedly rejected.  
For the foreseeable future, the value of counter terrorism will 
consciously continue to be played as a trump card against 
journalistic data and the interests of free expression and free 
information in many societies. The three trends now impinging on 
journalistic activities with reference to counter terrorism seem set 
to strengthen for now. 
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